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Assistant Director for Operations

2 September 1948

Chief, FDB

Air Force "Treasure Island" Project

*orig Mms 9/7/48  
sent to Chief. I hope  
for use in work on central  
SAC translation  
pool from  
G.P.C.  
u.s.*

1. Subject project has been reviewed by this office and comments are forwarded herewith in accordance with your memorandum dated 26 August.

2. The Treasure Island study unfortunately does not define clearly what is meant by some of the terms it employs. For example, it uses abstracting and extracting apparently inter-changeably without defining either one. Again, it speaks of Slavic publications of all kinds without clarifying whether this includes all Satellite countries or just Slavic countries. It further mentions (throughout) intelligence exploitation yet would place the major portion of the operation under contract with the Library of Congress, a non-intelligence agency and the second largest share of the operation under the Army Library, also a non-intelligence unit. Next, it speaks of Air Intelligence requirements on the one hand and on the other of indexing and cross-indexing all information in order to achieve complete coverage, so that this would be available to another government agency that may wish to participate in the project.

*(Consider  
how far  
and how far)*

*material  
from*

3. Accordingly, before an estimate of the work involved in handling the ~~lead~~ *lead* ~~surveys~~ can be made, the following premises must be established in line with the general tone of what accomplishment is desired.

a. That all intelligence material will be extracted except political and sociological.

b. That extracting or abstracting as used in the study means the reporting in English of all information of intelligence value appearing in all available Slavic language publications.

c. That Slavic publications are presumed to include only Polish, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Slovak and Bohemian in addition to Russian and will exclude publications in the some one hundred and ten (110) non-Slavic languages used in the USSR.

d. That all information of intelligence value will be indexed, cross-indexed and filed.

e. That backlog figures as given in the study are accepted.

f. That all information extracted will be published and disseminated.

g. That unlearned personnel would be authorized for use in the operation.

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h. That this is an intelligence operation and will not be administered or handled by a non-intelligence unit.

i. That FBIB will handle all foreign broadcast material.

j. That all university projects are handled by ONE - State - Contacts Branch.

4. Based on the above promises, the following figures can then be computed for the work involved.

a. Backlog (5-year plan)

(1) Newspapers (100,000)

Experience has shown that the average extractor can cover five Slavic language newspapers per day. Therefore, for 100,000 newspapers over a five-year period 17 people would be required.

(2) Periodicals (30,000)

The average Slavic periodical is estimated to contain 80 pages. To read and extract the intelligence information from the average periodical would require eight days on the basis that the extractor can cover 10 pages a day. For the backlog of 30,000 periodicals then 200 extractors would be required.

(3) Books and other publications (20,000)

Experience has shown that probably only 10% or 2,000 of this backlog would be of intelligence interest. Since the average book must be considered to have 250 pages and for the books selected approximately 50% on the average is worth extracting, the average linguist should cover a book in 25 days. Therefore, 44 translators would be needed for this phase.

b. Current publications

(1) Newspapers

For an estimated 80 current Slavic newspapers on the basis of five newspapers per day per person, 16 extractors would be required.

(2) Periodicals

It is estimated that at least 140 Russian and 100 other Slavic language periodicals would be processed of

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which 25% would be bi-monthly. On the same basis as used in 4a(2) above 75 linguists would be required.

(3) Books and other publications

An estimate of current available Slavic books and publications of intelligence interest would place the figure at 75 a month. On the basis used in 4a(3) above this phase would require 85 people.

c. For the other phases of the operation, experience has shown that the following numbers of personnel would be required. Supervision and direction - 59 intelligence officers. Rough-draft typing - 50 typists. Screening analysts to sort all publications - 20. Editorial and reproduction - 104. Indexing, cross-indexing, filing and searching - 80. Administration - including personnel, supply and services and correspondence files - 25.

d. In summation, then the following figures show that a total of 778 people would be required.

Linguist - extractors	440
Supervisory	59
Editorial	104
Typists	50
Files	80
Screeners	20
Administrative	25
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	778

5. In answer to the second question contained in referenced memorandum, it can be stated that if the personnel required as outlined in Para 4 above could be procured, the work could be done by FDB with un-cleared personnel provided that all supervisory, administrative, screening and filing personnel, all newspaper extractors, half of the editorial section and 10 typists were cleared. *omit*

6. Over and above the statistical problem of the work involved and personnel required for it, there are a number of points in the study which it is thought advisable to bring to your attention. These will be divided into three major categories: questions, false statements and disagreements.

7. Questions

The following points in addition to those mentioned in Para 2 above are not clarified in the Treasure Island study:

a. Since this plan indicts present agencies with producing only a trickle of information, what does it mean when it says:

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"Nevertheless, the sheer volume of these unorganized and uncoordinated digests is so large that it is very difficult for SV to handle them properly" (cf. 2c(3))

b. What type of material (in what languages) and extending over what period is included in the small numbers which are stated in this plan (4c) and which FDB has allowed in its premises above?

c. If the extracting service could be limited to the fields of economics, industry, technology, sciences, military matters and geography [which is, however, 3/4 of the intelligence categories] (4c) what is meant by "complete coverage of all the materials that are actually available (2c(3)) and "provides facilities for the carrying out of such extracting services as are necessary if a complete coverage of open source materials is to be achieved" (3d)?

d. "It would be a good selling point to have all the information indexed and cross-indexed so that extracts of any kind can be made, provided the requesting agency pays for it." *omitted in edition*

(1) Does this mean that information would be indexed previous to extracting, i.e. using linguists for indexers?

(2) Does "all the information mean"

- (a) all information from the limited categories
- (b) all information of intelligence value
- (c) all information?

### 8. False statements

a. "...no attention is given to [Soviet] books, government publications (for example, directories), pictures or maps" (2c(4)).

b. "IO is the government's purchasing agent for foreign publications" (4b).

### 9. Disagreements

a. "The extracts and digests (now being produced) are mostly made for purposes which are totally different from the mission of the Air Intelligence Division (2c(1)).

They are not totally different from, but also are not exclusively for Air Intelligence Division.

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b. "Most of the extracts (now being produced) are actually made in a very poor fashion by people unfamiliar with intelligence requirements" (2a(2)).

Most of them are made by people who, at least, are more authorized to know intelligence requirements than any group working for the Library of Congress.

c. With reference to statement in 3a that a centralized extracting agency is not practical, it appears from the arguments of the plan itself that such a centralized extracting agency is the only practical solution to economy linked with sufficient not-uncoordinated, not-reduplicated production.

d. "Since present extracting staffs are small and overworked, and since a great deal of required work is not being done, the establishment of new extracting units cannot be averted" (3c).

This is contrary to reasons:

(1) Staffs are small because of recruitment or budgetary problems.

(2) Present staffs are at least familiar with the problems of document exploitation and an enlargement of these staffs to do the additional work required is more logical and sensible than mushrooming the government with new ones.

e. "It was thought advisable that LC participate in any extracting scheme which might be involved." (4b)

The Library of Congress is not an intelligence agency.

f. The 50 extractors proposed to handle the backlog (4b) could hardly do more than make bibliographies and translate headlines and tables of contents for this backlog in 5 years - a procedure which for the urgency of intelligence information is decidedly unsatisfactory. That these same 50 extractors could simultaneously handle current books and government reports is unrealistic.

*thought* { g. The method of extracting by entering the information on check sheets with a limited number of pertinent questions (4d) is practicable only for target data and by no means applicable to the wide field of intelligence. At least 3/4 of the effort used in exploiting these documents would be wasted by this method. A steady stream of information reports flowing into the hands of well-qualified analysts is the only efficient method of handling foreign information as the result of definite collection directives. *believed to be the most effective*

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h. Paragraph 5a of the plan calls for a Basic Information Section to coordinate the extracting of intelligence information by the Library of Congress (non-intelligence), Army Map Service (non-intelligence), CIA (intelligence), Photo Library (non-intelligence), Aero Chart Service (non-intelligence) and private firms (non-intelligence).

(1) CIA is the authorized coordinator of intelligence for the US Government.

(2) Only one of the above extracting parties is an intelligence organization.

J. J. BAGNALL

Encl: 1 (Treasure Island Study)

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Chief, FDB

26 August 1948

Assistant Director for Operations

Air Force "Treasure Island" Project

1. Comments requested on work involved in handling the load envisaged in the attached.
2. Could FDB do the job with uncleared personnel?
3. Reply requested by Wednesday, 1 September.

GEORGE G. CAREY

Inclosure  
Study "Treasure Island"

GGC/acg

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TREASURE ISLAND

THE PROBLEM

1. To organize an extracting and digesting service to exploit open intelligence sources, including Slavic publications of all kinds.

2. To set up an organization which could procure intelligence free of charge from private institutions, including universities and military schools. 09586

HYPOTHESIS

3. The need for intelligence materials and open source information will become increasingly acute.

DISCUSSION

4. A very large portion of information pertinent to the mission of the Air Intelligence Division is available in open source materials. The intelligence mission cannot be accomplished in a satisfactory manner without a systematic and thorough exploitation of unclassified publications, such as books, periodicals, newspapers, foreign government handbooks, broadcasts, atlases, etc. At present, no such exploitation is being carried out although the source materials are available in the United States. Consequently, a great deal of pertinent information is unavailable for purposes of intelligence analyses. (See Appendix A.)

5. A considerable amount of intelligence is continuously worked up by universities and military schools. There is no coordination between these activities and the work done in the Air Intelligence Division, although indications are that universities and other schools would be willing to cooperate. (See Appendix A.)

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6. A great deal of the work done by universities could be obtained free of charge. The extracting service would have to be financed, yet cost requirements cannot be estimated at this juncture, because it is not known which of the existing facilities can be brought into the scheme. It is clear, however, that the investment required to finance Treasure Island will be small, at least in relation to its usefulness. It is believed that, within a few years, it will be possible to say: "Never before was so much intelligence gained from so small a cost."

#### CONCLUSIONS

7. At the present time the Air Intelligence Division does not receive basic information from open sources either in sufficient quantity or in good quality.

8. The satisfactory accomplishment of the air intelligence mission requires a coordinated effort by the Directorate of Intelligence and other agencies for the exploitation of open source materials.

9. The organization of such an effort requires the setting-up in the Directorate of Intelligence of a special unit, tentatively called Basic Information Section. The extracting service can best be started through a contract with the Library of Congress.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

10. That a Basic Information Section be set up in the Directorate of Intelligence, (to be staffed by six officers, three professionals and five CAF's.)

11. That the Basic Information Section be instructed to set up and supervise a service for the extraction of pertinent information from Slavic open source materials.

12. That the Basic Information Section be directed to negotiate a contract with the Library of Congress in order to have the Library

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do preliminary indexing and searching, and in order to start the unit processing current books and the backlog.

*omitted* 13. That the Basic Information Section be instructed to organize the procurement of intelligence from military schools, universities and other private organizations.

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APPENDIX "A"

INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS

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APPENDIX "A"

INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS

SUMMARY

1. Open source materials are of great value to intelligence. A great deal of valuable information can be culled from publications, such as books, periodicals, newspapers, broadcasts, and government reports. Valuable information can also be obtained from research done at military and civilian schools.
2. At present open source materials are inadequately exploited. The Air Intelligence Division does not obtain the information contained in such materials nor is there an organization which is extracting intelligence data that are available in such materials.
3. There is a great need for reorganizing methods and procedures for the procurement of open source intelligence. Such a reorganization requires the setting-up of a Basic Information Section in the Directorate of Intelligence; the setting-up of an Administrative, Filing and Publishing Section in the Library of Congress; the establishment of procurement units in the Library of Congress; the creation of an extracting unit in the Library of Congress; and a coordination with extracting and abstracting units in the ~~Army~~, the CIA, and other government agencies as well as private firms.

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APPENDIX "A"

INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS

DISCUSSION

1. The Value of Open Source Materials

a. Intelligence work is based on two different types of materials: open and classified. Classified materials include those which are originated or processed by United States governmental agencies and which are kept under strict security restrictions. Some of these materials are obtained by secret means. In most instances, they report on facts and developments which foreign nations want to keep secret. Among the open sources are those which are originated by foreign governmental or non-governmental agencies, to which the originator does not attach security restrictions. These materials can usually be bought in the open market or obtained without too many difficulties. They include magazines, newspapers, books, government reports and documents, broadcasts and news pictures.

b. In customary intelligence routine, great stress is laid on working with classified materials. The importance of the classified materials cannot, of course, be minimized in any manner; a large percentage of significant facts cannot be gathered except through secret sources. Yet, the two types of source materials complement and supplement each other; taken singly none of them gives the complete picture. Despite the fact that classified intelligence documents will be most profitable if they are correlated with open source materials, the value of the open sources is often underrated. Only haphazard efforts are made to procure and exploit the unclassified type of intelligence source materials.

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c. It is sometimes felt that open sources do not contain any materials that are worth gathering. At least, this is supposed to be true with respect to the open sources published by dictatorial countries, the censor allegedly cutting out anything that may be of use to foreign intelligence services. However, experience with the German censorship during the war showed that even very important military information can be collected from newspapers. For example, it was believed that German P/T boats were armed with 20mm guns. Interpretation of a photograph published in a German newspaper showed that these boats actually carried 40mm guns. On the authority of General Donovan, it appears that most of the information about the German oil industry was gathered from newspapers. It may be added that strategic and tactical doctrines, too, were freely discussed in German technical publications. For example, the joint employment of aircraft and tanks was described as early as 1934 by a German General in a book which was easily obtainable all over the world for \$2.50; the tactics which he had outlined were applied by the Germans throughout the early campaigns of the second World War.

d. However severe, censorship is never fool-proof. Censorship personnel is rarely too intelligent, and almost never well informed. Very often items are published of which the significance escapes the censor. Descriptions of cities and plants usually give away some good clues. Obituaries often contain inadvertant references to a person's place of work; advertisements or propaganda indicate the output of a given plant; technical discussions of production processes sometimes permit deductions as to locations, quality and output. The Russian press offers, moreover, the specific advantage that (1) the labor crews of factories frequently send telegrams to Stalin; (2) praise

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is given to specifically named plants which exceeded their output assignment; and (3) criticism is often voiced of production achievements in named factories. Although many of these items are camouflaged, and incompletely reproduced, additional information from classified as well as open sources usually permits the completion of the story.

e. Censorship requirements are changeable. Items that are secret now were freely revealed a few years ago. From time to time, facts, such as locations and types of factories, remain more or less constant; present-day censorship is not necessarily an obstacle to collecting pertinent information. For example, the Russians do not now publish information about uranium deposits. Yet the literature contains many references to uranium deposits in the Soviet Union. Time and again, it was possible to evaluate classified reports on the discovery of uranium on the basis of previously published geological reports; in some instances, it was forecast where the Russians would soon start digging for the uranium in Czechoslovakia. For that matter, current Russian publications occasionally contain references to "rare minerals" which, sometimes, turn out to be uranium.

f. In the specific field of SV intelligence, there are several target categories which must needs be worked up on the basis of open materials. It is not implied that no useful information on these categories is being obtained from classified sources, but the fact remains that the over-all picture of these categories has been gained through open sources, including those German-captured documents which had been worked up from Russian open publications.

g. In the railroad category, rail lines, trackage, stations, bridges, marshalling yards, over-all tonnages carried, types of commodities carried, types of rolling stock used, capacity of locomotives and freight cars were obtained from open sources. There is also avail-

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able a great deal of information about railroad operations. There is no information on a few secret rail lines, nor on freight train time tables, but open information is adequate to list most of the important rail targets and, if necessary, to permit the SV Branch, without benefit of classified information, to set up rail targets the destruction of which would greatly impair Soviet rail capacity.

h. An estimated 75 per cent of the electric power stations listed in SV files were identified on the basis of open materials. At the present time, the Soviets do not seem to censor news about power stations, with the exception of information on grid systems. The Soviets, usually, announce when a power station starts operations; in some instances they go as far as revealing details about generators, including the places of production, capacity, plant layout, etc. Negative clues can be obtained about areas which are not mentioned. For example, the Chusovoy hydro-electric program which figured prominently in the news up to about two years ago, apparently is no longer commented upon. Since there is information about various important atomic developments in that area, Soviet silence provides some kind of a confirmation.

i. It is most surprising that a great amount of open source information is obtained on highly classified industrial categories. The discovery of new oil fields is usually reported in the Soviet press. The British, by patient research in papers and periodicals, were able to identify about 40 aircraft plants, including their locations and numbers.

j. Soviet papers contain frequent mention of new cities. It will be recalled that, according to Marshal Rundstedt, the German army was greatly handicapped because their maps failed to show newly erected cities. If the Germans had sufficiently exploited the open sources of information, most of the gaps in their knowledge of Russian towns would have been closed.

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k. A good illustration of the value of open source materials is provided by the work done by John Scott, the American engineer who spent many years in Russia. Early during the war the Board of Economic Warfare put him on the job of collecting open source information on Russia. With only four female assistants, Scott produced an 815-page volume "Russia East of the Volga". Practically every industrial category and all minerals were covered in the document, which also listed dozens of new cities. Even today, the Scott Report is often used to great advantage. It contains information about many plants and places concerning which no other data are available in SV files.

l. Open sources are indispensable for over-all economic and industrial analyses. Misleading and incomplete though Russian statistics are, they are nevertheless the only available basis for statistical evaluations of the Soviet war potential, the productivity of individual industries, and the general organization of the Soviet economy. Without the periodic reports on the progress of the Five Year Plans, no over-all picture of Soviet capabilities and vulnerabilities could be obtained, despite the fact that no Russian statement can be accepted at face value, but must be thoroughly analyzed and checked with other data.

m. Open materials are equally needed for the analysis of strategically vital categories. For example, without unclassified basic geographic data, such as climate, freezing conditions of rivers, water depths, chemical content of water, elevations, roads, geology, etc., it would be very difficult to crack the secrets of the Soviet atomic program.

n. Russian open sources contain a great number of photographs and other pictorial materials, including plant layouts. There are quite a few industrial pictures which could be used for target folders. There are also pictures of Russian products which would give clues as

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to output of specific plants and quality of Russian technology. There are numerous pictures of outstanding architectural structures which would be very valuable as identifiable landmarks.

o. It is concluded that the exploitation of open sources is not only a very valuable but actually an indispensable part of intelligence operations.

## 2. Current Exploitation of Open Source Materials

a. Preliminary surveys have shown that a very large percentage of total Russian open source materials are available in the United States. In the Washington area alone, the Library of Congress plus various other government agencies, such as the CIA, Army Library, and State Department have been receiving, during the past five to ten years, at least one-half, or more, of the Russian output in publications. Large university libraries, such as Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, and the New York Public Library also possess considerable collections of Russian materials. There are innumerable small but nevertheless valuable Slavic libraries in the hands of minor universities, special research organizations, industrial firms and private individuals. The Library of Congress is now trying to obtain all current Soviet publications on a regular basis.

b. Several agencies have been set up to produce bibliographies, abstracts and digests from these materials. The Strategic Vulnerability Branch receives about a dozen of such publications, not including technological abstracts produced by private agencies. Some information is extracted by SV analysts from English-language publications issued by the Soviet government. From time to time, additional information is culled from the digests published by the British Joint Intelligence Board. Recently, the CIA started the Soviet Press Extracts which hold out some promise, but, notwithstanding this seemingly

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large quantity of open source materials there is no flow of information; there is, at best, a trickle.

c. The reasons for this highly unsatisfactory state of affairs are the following:

- (1) The extracts and digests are mostly made for purposes which are totally different from the mission of the Air Intelligence Division.
- (2) Most of the extracts are actually made in a very poor fashion by people unfamiliar with intelligence requirements. Many digests, especially the Daily Reports on Foreign Radio Broadcasts, attempt to reproduce current news and propaganda, but consistently omit intelligence data.
- (3) The confusion in the abstracting field has had the deplorable consequence that, while many items are reproduced in most of the publications, there is not, by a long shot, a complete coverage of all the materials that are actually available. Nevertheless, the sheer volume of these unorganized and uncoordinated digests is so large that it is very difficult for the SV Branch to handle them properly.
- (4) While every abstracting service tries to include representative Soviet publications, such as Pravda and Izvestiya, no attention at all is given to books, government publications, (for example directories), pictures or maps. Hence, a great many of the valuable sources are not exploited, while other sources are exploited several times over, but each time in a manner unsatisfactory to the Air Intelligence Division.

### 3. Remedies

- a. A preliminary survey of the situation as well as discussions

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with specialists in the abstracting field have shown that it would not be practical to organize one big independent super-abstracting service which could serve all the interests of all the agencies. Even if such a service were practical, the setting-up of a special agency would require a very long time. Moreover, there would be no certainty that air force intelligence requirements would be satisfied unless, of course, the air force would be able to exert control over operations.

b. It would, therefore, be necessary to make use of the abstracting units that already exist. An arrangement with such units would be profitable not only for budgetary reasons but also because some of these units have control over source materials.

c. At the same time, since present extracting staffs are small and overworked, and since a great deal of the required work is not being done, the establishment of new extracting units cannot be averted.

d. Hence, a solution must be found which (1) avoids the setting-up of one independent super-extracting agency; (2) achieves a maximum of cooperation from existing agencies; and (3) provides facilities for the carrying-out of such extracting services as are necessary if a complete coverage of open source materials is to be achieved.

e. Before a satisfactory plan for the division of labor among the various would-be participants in the program can be evolved, it is necessary as a preliminary, to determine which sources ought to be processed and to locate the source materials not now in Washington but available elsewhere in the United States. Such a preliminary job must needs be done by the Library of Congress which would have to be given a contract in order to enable them to complete their index of Slavic materials and to make full use of the Union Catalogue.

#### 4. Results of Discussions with the Library of Congress

a. In informal discussions with representatives of the Library

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of Congress, it was determined that an extracting service could not function satisfactorily without a searching unit permanently operating in the Library, or without a routine channel to the Acquisitions Division.

b. It was thought advisable that the Library of Congress participate in any extracting scheme that might be evolved. The Library is the government's purchasing agent for foreign publications and it possesses what is probably the country's largest Slavic collection. The Library is the organization most suited for locating and loaning operations and it is the best medium for the camouflage of the entire undertaking.

c. There was no argument about the need for a new unit if the backlog of books and other publications as well as the current accessions of books are to be handled. The backlog is estimated to comprise 20,000 books, more than 30,000 periodicals and more than 100,000 newspapers, not to mention the backlog of other materials, such as broadcasts, for example. It has been tentatively estimated that such a unit would require about 50 extractors and indexers and 10 CAF's. A unit of that size could process the backlog in 5 to 6 years, and also handle current acquisitions of books and government reports. Such a new unit would work most efficiently in the Library of Congress. (See Annex I).

d. With respect to the actual processing of the materials, it would be most effective if extracts were done on check sheets listing a limited number of pertinent questions, such as those on the target information sheets. At the end of each check sheet a short digest of the processed material would be appended. The extract sheets would then be collected and consolidated and put into a publication, to be issued at regular intervals, preferably weekly. The information would also be

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maintained in a central file.

e. The discussions suggested the advisability of limiting the scope of the extraction effort. If, for example, political information were processed, the entire project would have to be very large in size, while the expenditure would not be worth the result, certainly not in so far as the Air Intelligence Division is concerned. The extracting service could be profitably limited to the fields of economics, industry, technology, science, military matters, and geography.

f. It was recognized that even within this "limitation" economy of effort could be practiced. For example, a great deal of information may be available on the paper industry, but there might be no current need for this information; hence, it would be wasteful to process and reproduce it. However, since intelligence needs cannot be anticipated, and since it is conceivable that, for one reason or another, even the paper industry may assume importance, a central file would have to be maintained in such a manner that, at a moment's notice, any inactive category can be worked up. It might even be advisable to maintain the file for subjects which hardly ever will become of interest to the Air Intelligence Division, simply because another government agency may want to participate in the program at a later date. It would be a good selling point to have all the information indexed and cross-indexed so that extracts of any kind can be made, provided the requesting agency pays for it.

g. For various technical reasons, it is believed that the Library of Congress would be the logical agency to be put in charge of both the actual publishing and the central file. It is very tentatively estimated that a publishing and filing unit would require about 25 people, including 6 first-class editors, each one being in charge of one of the main subject headings. (See Annex I).

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h. In order to get the extracting effort going it would simply be necessary for the air force to make a contract with the Library of Congress which then would set up the various activities and units outlined above. It is believed that once the extracting service has been started, cooperation from other agencies will be obtained more easily.

#### 5. Open Questions

a. Up to this point, there is not much room for disagreement about the organization of the extracting services. Difficulties arise, however, with respect to the ways and means by which other government agencies and private abstracting firms could, or should, be brought into the scheme. It is relatively easy to conceive of a set-up by which the labor would be efficiently and equitably divided. For example, if the Library of Congress would handle current books, government periodicals, and the backlog of periodicals and newspapers, the Army Library, which operates a periodicals abstracting service, could handle current periodicals. The CIA, which already has made a start in the field of newspaper abstracting, could take over current newspapers. The CIA also has facilities for radio monitoring and for the procurement of industrial documents. Contracts could be made with private firms for the processing of technological and scientific materials. Specialized organizations, such as the Photo Library and the Aero Chart Service, could profitably participate in the processing. The extracting services would have to be coordinated with the Air Research Unit at the Library of Congress. It would also be advisable to arrange for a division of labor with the British JIB.

b. Although such an over-all organization can be conceived in theory (See Annex I), it must be anticipated that various administrative and "political" obstacles will arise. It is obvious, at any rate, that the setting-up of a coordinated effort on such a scale will

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require a great deal of work. Lengthy negotiations will be required. Even after contracts will have been concluded, adjustments will be necessary quite frequently.

6. Basic Information Section

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a. The intelligence requirements within the Air Intelligence Division fluctuate and are most variegated. It would demand a considerable effort to keep informed about the changing requirements of all branches and sections and provide for good service on the part of the extracting organization. Last but not least, the huge extracting effort would require steady supervision; since this effort is to be done in behalf of the Directorate of Intelligence, it follows that this supervision must be exercised from within the Directorate of Intelligence. It would, therefore, be necessary to set up a special unit in the Directorate of Intelligence, tentatively called Basic Information Section.

b. The functions of the Basic Information Section would be:

- (1) To organize, contract and, later, to coordinate and supervise the entire extracting effort and to keep it constantly geared to changing air intelligence requirements;
- (2) To formulate policies and determine priorities;
- (3) To set up procedures, such as the devising of formats which the extracts that are to be made and published are to follow.

7. Academic Sources of Intelligence

a. Once the extracting service operates, the work load on the Basic Information Section with respect to extracting would decrease. If that time comes, the Section would be able to concentrate on obtaining intelligence from private and academic sources, and from military schools.

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b. Many military schools all over the country work on area studies. During the last year the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk specialized on the Middle East; during the coming year, regional studies of the Arctic will be done. In the course of these studies the students will inevitably obtain intelligence data which could be incorporated into SV and other intelligence files. Another example: it is planned by the Intelligence School to train students in industrial intelligence, e.g., have them report on factories or urban areas. The result of such work, even though it may not always be first-class, could also be obtained. Transportation and logistical support studies are done by most military schools very frequently for virtually all important areas of the globe. If these studies were procured, the job of the SV transportation analysts -- who at present cannot possibly catch up with their work -- would become manageable.

c. It would also be possible to use officers assigned to the air force's educational program for purposes of intelligence collection. For example, some time in 1947, A-5 wanted to get an answer to the question: "Can the United States support an all-jet air force?" Due to personnel ceilings and the heavy work load at headquarters, this problem could not be tackled. A-5, therefore, asked the Air University to have the job done. The Air University assigned the problem to Georgetown University where five air force officer students split up the work, each preparing an intelligence study, which the University validated as an M.A. thesis. The final over-all study was some 600 pages thick and was judged to be useful.

d. It goes without saying that many problems could similarly be farmed out not only to officers, but also to civilian students. In other words, some influence may be exerted to see that dissertation subjects are selected which are of value to the Air Intelligence Division.

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There is little doubt that, above all, materials for, presently more or less dormant sections could be obtained in this manner. As an example, preliminary (first phase) studies of American urban areas could be procured from civilian institutions. In most cases the work could be procured free of charge, while it would require far more personnel than is allowed at present if such jobs were to be done in the Air Intelligence Division.

c. While there is hardly any doubt that many, though not all, universities would cooperate in such a program, it would be necessary to work out effective procedures; to maintain constant liaison between the Directorate of Intelligence and the private researchers; and to do the programming of the research effort. The job would be of a large enough scope to warrant the establishment of a special unit within the Basic Information Section from the very start, or to have most of the facilities of that Section used for "academic liaison" after the extraction activities have started operating in a routine fashion.

f. It is tentatively estimated that the Basic Information Section would be most satisfactorily staffed by 6 officers, 3 professionals and 5 CAF's. Under the chief of the Section, who should have experience in intelligence, university research and possibly librarianship, there would have to be at least 3 officers, in charge of liaison with the Library of Congress; intelligence agencies and military schools; and civilian research institutions. Actually, there would be enough work for 5 officers under the section chief. Those officers would have to be assisted by 3 civilians in charge of Procedures, Programming and Content Supervision. The Procedures man would work out formats; the Programming man would establish priorities for the extracting service, keep informed on research programs undertaken by private institutions and military schools, and make suggestions about research to be done by those various

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institutions that would be of value to the Air Intelligence Division; the Content Supervision man would, above all, check on the output of the extracting service and, as far as possible, on the research done by outside sources.

g. To sum up: in order to get a fully satisfactory service specializing in the extraction of intelligence from open source materials and, at the same time, to derive benefits from the research done at military and civilian schools, it is necessary to set up a Basic Information Section in the Directorate of Intelligence. This Section would maintain liaison with military and civilian schools and control the administration of the extracting services. This administration, to be located in the Library of Congress, would control procurement of materials, maintain Liaison with the Acquisitions Division in the Library, keep a central file, and publish the extracts. The administration would control the various extracting units, located in the Library of Congress and in other government agencies. The work would most advantageously be divided up in such a manner that each participating agency would handle one major category of open source materials.

h. The total manpower and money requirements of the scheme cannot be estimated at this juncture, because it is not known which existing facilities can be brought into the scheme. An exact budgetary estimate must wait till the time when negotiations with various government agencies will have been engaged. It is clear, however, that the investment required to undertake the Treasure Island scheme will be relatively small and that the managerial difficulties and costs will be minor. The gain in terms of information obtained will, by contract, be very large. It is more than probable, indeed certain, that within a few years it will be said that never before in the history of American intelligence was so simple and inexpensive an effort needed to produce so great and so valuable a return.

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director for Operations

DATE: 25 August 1948

FROM : Acting Chief, FBIB

SUBJECT: Air Force "Treasure Island" Project

REFERENCES: a. Memorandum, dated 28 June 1948, to Assistant Director for Operations from Chief, FBIB, subject: Authority to Implement Study of Proposed Activities of Special Reports Division

b. Section II of memorandum, dated 16 June 1948, to Chief, FBIB, from Chief, Special Reports Division, subject: Recommended Expansion and Improvement of Special Reports Division Functions, attached as appendix 1 to reference a.

1. In reply to your memorandum, dated 20 August 1948, subject as above, the proposed Treasure Island project is considered an excellent example of the type of special report as recommended in reference b above by the Chief, Special Reports Division, FBIB.

2. Detailed work involved in accepting action on the Treasure Island project cannot be undertaken by the FBIB Special Reports Division on a continuing basis covering a variety of intelligence categories without an increase in personnel.

3. It is estimated that an increase of four professional analysts and three clerk-typists would be initially required.

4. It is felt that it would be feasible to undertake this project with uncleared personnel since it would not be absolutely essential for them to have access to classified material. However, it is felt that better work could be accomplished if the personnel engaged on this project had access to relevant classified material.

5. If this project is to be undertaken by unclassified personnel assigned to a pool, it is recommended that security clearance be initiated at the earliest practicable date.

Enclosure  
Study "Treasure Island"

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memo ask. for  
Comments 8/26*

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